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RECOGNIZING THE GREY: TOWARD A NEW VIEW OF THE
LAW GOVERNING DIGITAL MUSIC SAMPLING INFORMED
BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT
William Y. Durbin*
INTRODUCTION
A trio of rappers from New York,' working with a pair of producers from
California,2 broke new musical ground in 1989 with the release of the album Paul's
Boutique. The Beastie Boys and Dust Brothers wove together a complex tapestry
of samples and highly referential raps4 the likes of which the music industry had never
seen.5 Fortunately for the Beasties and their producers, they released the album at a
time when the laws governing sampling were not clearly defined.6 Nor were they
strictly enforced. With the subsequent tightening of laws governing the use of sam-
pling in music, 7 however, it became unlikely such an album would ever be seen again.
* J.D., William & Mary School of Law, 2007; B.A., Yale University, 2002. The author
would like to thank Professors Neal Devins and Trotter Hardy for their helpful comments and
suggestions. He would also like to thank his family and friends, who have been steadfastly
dashing and daring, courageous and caring.
' The Beastie Boys, consisting of Michael Diamond ("Mike D"), Adam Horovitz ("King
Ad-Rock"), and Adam Yauch ("MCA"), began as a punk band in the early 1980s, morphed
into irreverent party rock-rappers, and eventually, through their ability to reinvent themselves
and be open to new styles, became one of the most influential hip-hop acts of all time. See, e.g.,
PETER SHAPIRO, THE ROUGH GUIDE TO HIP-HoP 15-18 (2001).
2 Mike Simpson and John King, collectively known as The Dust Brothers, made a name
for themselves as remixers and producers in the 1980s and 1990s through their innovative cut-
and-paste musical compositions. See Jason Ankeny, The Dust Brothers: Biography, http://
www.allmusic.com/cg/amg.dll?p=amg&sql=llmd9kectkg79-T 1 (last visited Oct. 25,2006).
3 Although the album initially received tepid commercial and critical responses, it has
become widely acclaimed as one of the most innovative and influential albums of the period
for its pioneering use of digital sampling. See Stephen Thomas Erlewine, Paul's Boutique:
Review, http://www.allmusic.com/cg/amg.dll?p=amg&sql=10:Xn8b5x4tsqg-T 1 (last visited
Oct. 25, 2006); see also Rob Sheffield, Review of Paul's Boutique, ROLLING STONE, Feb. 6,
2003, at 65, available at http://www.rollingstone.con/reviews/album/_/id/I 17996.
4 By one count, the album incorporates more than 135 samples and at least 180 lyrical
references into 15 song tracks. See Paul's Boutique Samples and Reference List, http://www
.paulsboutique.info/index.php (last visited Feb. 17,2007). For a complete discussion of what
is meant by "samples" and "sampling," see infra Part I.A-B.
See Sheffield, supra note 3.
6 See Noah Shachtman, Copyright Enters a Gray Area, WIRED, http://www.wired.com-
entertainment/music/news/2004/02/62276 (last visited Jan. 10, 2007).
' One of the earliest and most significant cases to bring about this tightening involved
a singer-songwriter's claim of copyright infringement against a rap artist for his incorporation
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Fifteen years later, an equally ground-breaking, sample-rich album surfaced. In
early 2004, DJ Danger Mouse8 released The Grey Album, mixing the vocals of rapper
Jay-Z's The Black Album with the instrumentation of The Beatles' self-titled album
commonly referred to as The White Album.9 Producing just 3,000 copies of the album
and intending it to remain "underground," Burton never thought he would need per-
mission to use the other artists' material.1° But once the album found its way to the
Internet, it reached an audience far wider than Burton had envisioned. " The album
met immediate critical acclaim, with Rolling Stone calling it an "ingenious hip-hop
record that sounds oddly ahead of its time." 12
With this wider audience and critical acclaim, it was soon no secret that Burton
never received permission to use The Black Album or The White Album in his new
composition. 3 For their part, Jay-Z and his record label, Roc-A-Fella Records, did not
object to Burton's use of The Black Album; in fact, they tacitly encouraged the use
of the album in remixes, going so far as to release a vocals-only version that made
mixing it with other music all the easier.' 4 But EMI, which represented the owner
of the Beatles' sound-recording copyrights, Capitol Records, and Sony Music/ATV
Publishing, owner of the compositions on The White Album, sent Burton letters claim-
ing he was infringing upon their copyrights and ordering him to cease and desist in
distributing The Grey Album.1 5 The music industry thus demonstrated that it was
determined to protect its monopoly on the music by hook or by crook.
Neither EMI nor Sony Music/ATV Publishing filed suit against Burton or those
distributing The Grey Album online because they complied with the companies' cease-
and-desist letters and discontinued distribution of The Grey Album.' 6 Although music
activists staged a one-day protest by putting the album back online, and links to
download the album remain in a few hard-to-reach corners of the Internet, for the
of the singer-songwriter's recording into the rap recording. See Grand Upright Music Ltd.
v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
' DJ Danger Mouse's real name is Brian Burton, a 26-year-old disc jockey from White
Plains, New York, who prior to the release of The Grey Album, had made a small reputation for
himself in the underground hip-hop scene. He intended The Grey Album only to be a promo-
tional piece to showcase his talents as a DJ. See Bryan Bergman, Note, Into the Grey: The
Unclear Laws of Digital Sampling, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 619,620 (2005); see also
Shachtman, supra note 6.
9 See Shachtman, supra note 6.
10 See Fredrich N. Lim, Note, Grey Tuesday Leads to Blue Monday? Digital Sampling of
Sound Recordings After The Grey Album, 2004 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 369, 371.
" See id.; see also Bergman, supra note 8, at 621-22.
12 Lauren Gitlin, DJ Makes Jay-Z Meet Beatles, ROLLIJNG STONE, Feb. 5,2004, available
at http://www.rollingstone.com/news/story/5937152/dj_makesjayz_meet_beatles.
'3 See Bergman, supra note 8, at 621.
14 id.
15 Id.
16 See Lim, supra note 10, at 373.
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most part, the record industry succeeded in burying The Grey Album under a pile of
dusty legal arguments.17 Given the record industry's threats of legal action, and given
its greater ability to outlast any opponent it would be likely to face in such litigation,
it is unlikely that such a sample-rich album will ever be seen again-that is, unless the
law evolves to allow for more creativity and freedom in the art.
This Note addresses what happened to the law governing the use of samples in
music during those fifteen years between Paul's Boutique and The Grey Album, how
it has succeeded, and how it may be improved. It begins by defining and contextual-
izing the musical technique known as sampling and by discussing the technology and
the cases that have helped shape the law in recent years. Part I takes a closer look at
the law governing sampling in music, including its constitutional and statutory bases.
More specifically, this Note looks at recent developments in the case law as well as
the goals the law seeks to achieve.
In Part II, this Note revisits The Grey Album events as a case study in the law gov-
erning sampling. It addresses how the law succeeded and failed with respect to that
work and why, given the current state of the law, such a work might not appear again.
Part III considers how the law governing sampling in music is broken-how, in its
current state, the law fails to meet its goals. It considers possible improvements to the
law, including a compulsory licensing system and a First Amendment-based solution.
Finally, it hypothesizes how The Grey Album events might have played out under
these proposed "fixed" systems.
This Note concludes that the current law governing sampling in music is indeed
broken, failing to achieve its goals and conflicting with the Constitution. There may
be several ways to fix the law so as to comport with the goals of copyright law and the
Constitution, but none is perfect. Congress should consider the problem thoughtfully
and craft a solution--or statutorily recognize a system already in place but heretofore
ignored' 8-that accounts for the interests of the copyright owners as well as those of
other artists while being faithful to the Constitution. 9
'7 See Bergman, supra note 8, at 621-22.
'8 As argued in Part III.B, infra, the First Amendment may properly inform the law gov-
erning copyright generally and sampling in particular as a matter of constitutional law.
19 The topic of digital music sampling has received a good deal of scholarly treatment in
recent years. Articles have focused on a variety of issues related to the topic. See, e.g., Bergman,
supra note 8 (considering in detail the problems exposed by The Grey Album experience and
offering several possible solutions); David S. Blessing, Note, Who Speaks Latin Anymore?:
Translating De Minimis Use forApplication to Music Copyright Infringement and Sampling,
45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2399 (2004) (considering the question of how to determine whether
a sample is more than de minimis use and suggesting a new test for de minimis use); Lim, supra
note 10 (summarizing current sampling law and positing future developments); Carlos Ruiz de
la Torre, Essay, Digital Music Sampling and Copyright Law: Can the Interests of Copyright
Owners and Sampling Artists Be Reconciled?, 7 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 401 (2005) (discuss-
ing the current law and articulating five goals that should be taken into account by any pro-
posed solution). But none has synthesized a discussion of the state of the law with proposed
revisions to it incorporating arguments rooted in the First Amendment, as this Note does.
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A. Sampling Defined and Contextualized
"Sampling," or more completely, "digital music sampling," is the process of ap-
propriating elements of previous sound recordings to produce new music. 20 The pro-
cess allows an artist to borrow from and refer to existing sound recordings in order
to construct a sort of musical collage. Built upon the thoughts, feelings, and experi-
ences evoked by the various constituent sonic elements, bringing them together in a
new way, the resultant work takes on its own meaning and significance. The tech-
nique has become increasingly popular in contemporary music, particularly in the
genres of hip-hop, electronic dance music, and rock.2'
As it is used to create new music today, sampling consists of three steps: (1) digi-
tal recording, (2) computer sound analysis and possible modification, and (3) play-
back.22 Once in digital format, the sampled recording "can be manipulated and altered
to produce a desired effect on playback, including changes in pitch, speed, and dyna-
mics. '23 This technique affords tremendous opportunities for artistic expression, but
these opportunities "make it difficult to determine how much of the new expression
should be attributed to the original work and how much is created by the person uti-
lizing this [technique]."24
One of the earliest widely disseminated songs to incorporate samples was "Rev-
olution 9," by The Beatles, which employed snippets of British radio and television
broadcasts.25 The Sugar Hill Gang's 1979 single "Rapper's Delight," which looped
a portion of Chic's "Good Times," was the first commercial hit to make substantial
use of samples.26 Since then, numerous and disparate songs have employed samples
to make new music, from Dee-Lite' s "Groove Is In The Heart' 27 and MC Hammer's
"U Can't Touch This" 28 to Jessica Simpson's "I Think I'm In Love With You."29
20 26 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 537 (2005); see AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON
MusIc LIsTENING 1479-81 (3d ed. 2002).
21 See Ruiz de la Torre, supra note 19.
22 Bergman, supra note 8, at 623; see also Jeffrey S. Newton, Note, Digital Sampling: The
Copyright Considerations of a New Technological Use of Musical Performance, 11 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 671-75 (1989).
23 Bergman, supra note 8, at 623 (citing 26 AM. JuR. 3D Proof of Facts § 537 (2003)).
24 Blessing, supra note 19, at 2403.
25 See Josh Norek, Comment, "You Can't Sing without the Bling ": The Toll of Excessive
Sample License Fees on Creativity in Hip-Hop Music and the Needfor a Compulsory Sound
Recording Sample License System, 11 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 83, 86-87 (2004). This early foray
into sampling evinced that the technique need not necessarily involve the incorporation of
a music recording-other sound recordings, including spoken words from a variety of sources,
can also serve as musical constituents.
26 See id. at 87.
27 See Wikipedia.org, List of Sampled Songs, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of sampled
-songs (last visited Oct. 26, 2006) (listing Dee-Lite's "Groove Is In The Heart" as sampling
Herbie Hancock's "Bring Down The Birds").
28 See id. (listing MC Hammer's "U Can't Touch This" as sampling Rick James's "Super
Freak").
29 See id. (listing Jessica Simpson's "I Think I'm In Love With You" as sampling John
1024 [Vol. 15:1021
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The present system for "clearing," or gaining permission to use samples, is costly
for samplers in terms of both time and money.3" Samplers must obtain two licenses,
one for the sound recording itself and another for the musical composition.3 General
industry practice mandates that, "if a sample is recognizable to the ordinary listener,
it must be cleared. 32
To obtain the license for the sound recording, a sampler must receive permission
from the holder of the sound recording copyright, which is typically the record label
that produced the recording.33 A sampler needs additional permission, however, from
the owner of the compositional copyright, which is usually the artist himself or a
music publishing company.34 Often the licensing fees for both the sound recording
and musical composition sample can vary based on the stature of the artist and record
label seeking the license, and often, as just suggested, the two copyrights are owned
by different entities.35
One commentator has summarized the byzantine "clearing" scheme this way:
A sound recording license fee for a three-second sample
used only once in a new major label work may cost $1500 as an
advance on future royalties from album sales. For a looped sample
Mellencamp's "Jack & Diane").
3 See Norek, supra note 25, at 89.
31 id.
32 Id.; see also M. WILiAM KRASILOVSKY & SIDNEY SHEMEL, THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC
199-200 (9th ed. 2003). Although neither statutorily codified nor well settled, the de minimis
defense has been samplers' most reliable shield when faced with legal action. See generally
Blessing, supra note 19. The defense amounts to the defendant arguing that his re-use is in-
consequential and does not rise to the level of infringement. See id. at 2408-10. Courts con-
sider whether an "ordinary" listener would find a "substantial similarity" between the original
work and the new work, or whether the "quantitative and qualitative" appropriation of elements
of the original is significant. See, e.g., Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591, 594,596 (9th Cir.
2003), amended and superseded on denial of reh 'g by 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 545 U.S. 1114 (2005); Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215 (2d Cir.
1998); Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997); Bridgeport
Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 230 F. Supp. 2d 830 (M.D. Tenn. 2002); see also McDonald
v. Multimedia Entm't, Inc., 1991 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 26,809, at 24,771 (S.D.N.Y.
1991), available at 1991 WL 311921. But cf Jarvis v. A & M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282
(D.N.J. 1993) (simplifying de minimis test by asking whether the defendant appropriated
original constituent elements, either quantitatively or qualitatively).
13 See Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES.
L. REv. 673,686, 697-98 (2003).
31 See id. at 679, 697-98.
31 See Matthew R. Brodin, Comment, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films: The
Death of the Substantial Similarity Test in Digital Sampling Copyright Infringement Claims-
The Sixth Circuit's Flawed Attempt at a Bright-Line Rule, 6 MINN. J. L. Sci. & TECH. 825,
829 (2005); Norek, supra note 25, at 89.
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of three seconds or less, the fee varies from $1500 to $5000, while
a looped sample greater than three seconds can run into the tens
of thousands of dollars.
Upon clearing the sound recording, the sampler must still ob-
tain the musical composition license from the original author's
music publisher. A typical deal structure involves giving the orig-
inal copyright holder a percentage ownership in the new work's
musical composition copyright, as well as an advance on the ex-
pected publishing income.
For single use de minimis musical composition samples, a
major label-sampling act can expect to turn over 15% of the new
work's musical composition copyright to the sampled work's au-
thor. When the sampled portion is looped and constitutes a more
important part of the new work, that percentage often leaps to
66%. Music publishers that represent the original composition's
author usually impose the full eight-cent statutory rate, rather than
the six-cent "3/4 rate" that is industry custom for covers. The fig-
ure charged as an advance is then likely based upon a 100,000-
unit base, pro-rated by the percentage of copyright ownership held
by the original work's author. Thus, a new major label act would
likely pay a $4000 advance for the musical composition license
if the sampled work's author possessed 50% of the publishing in
the new work.36
Given the complexity and potential for great cost, this system may be so cumber-
some, particularly on emerging and independent artists, that it becomes preventative.
It should be simplified to encourage the use of sampling.
B. Developments Leave the Law Governing Sampling Ripe for Change
Sampling as a musical technique got its start in the 1960s and 1970s as DJs ex-
perimented with portable turntable sound systems to mix sounds from multiple vinyl
albums to create a single work.3 7 Soon vocalists, eventually called "rappers," began
reciting lyrics over the synthesized work to create the hip-hop sound popular today.38
With the advent of the digital synthesizer in the 1980s, sampling transitioned from
36 Norek, supra note 25, at 89-90 (citations omitted). The statutory rate has steadily in-
creased over time, standing, after the most recent jump on January 1, 2006, at 9.1 cents per
song. The Harry Fox Agency, Inc., Statutory Royalty Rates, http://www.harryfox.com/public/
licenseeRateCurrent.j sp (last visited Jan. 10, 2007); id., Historical Royalty Rates, http://www
.harryfox.com/public/historicalrates.jsp (last visited Jan. 10, 2007).
17 See Norek, supra note 25, at 86; see also Bergman, supra note 8, at 623.
38 See Norek, supra note 25, at 86.
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"merely a performance medium" to an important studio recording technique.39 More
recent technological advances have lowered the cost and increased the ease of employ-
ing sampling as a means of making music.' In addition, the increasing popularity and
availability of the Internet and associated file-sharing systems allow new songs to
reach ever-wider audiences, with the potential for more significant commercial impact.
To date, no specific statutory scheme has been developed to govern sampling, and,
as "most disputes regarding sampling have been settled out of court... [,] few judicial
standards have been set., 4 1 Still, an important body of case law is growing, built on
the law of copyright, that provides ground rules for what constitutes infringement
with respect to the use of samples in new music.
1. Early Cases
In the first few years of the 1990s, courts began to address the issue of sampling
head-on. An important preliminary case, McDonald v. Multimedia Entertainment,
Inc.,a2 provided a convenient formulation of the elements required to show copyright
infringement in musical compositions-again, one of the two copyrights implicated
in sampling. In McDonald, plaintiff composers alleged a media company, to whom
they had submitted compositions for possible use in promotions or "jingles," copied
substantial material from those compositions in the theme music for one of its tele-
vision programs.43 The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York stated a two-part test for establishing copyright infringement: "(1) that defen-
dant copied [plaintiffs'] work, and (2) that the copying was illicit in that defendant's
work is 'substantially similar' to plaintiffs'-i.e. [,] that defendant's work unlawfully
appropriates plaintiffs' protected creative expression in that it contains a substantial
degree of similarity to copyrightable elements of plaintiffs' work."
Under this "substantial similarity" standard, the court held that there was no in-
fringement of the jingles because the alleged infringement was of one rather unimpor-
tant note in two otherwise entirely dissimilar compositions, even though the jingles
and the theme music shared several elements, including the use of a saxophone as a
lead instrument, a similar tempo, a common three-note sequence, and the use of five
notes set to the same lyric.45 But on its way to that holding, the court made a crucial
observation: that "a defendant is not liable for [copyright] infringement even if he
copies, if the copied material is not protectable." 46 The ruling left open the question:
What is "protectable"?
'9 Bergman, supra note 8, at 623; see also Blessing, supra note 19, at 2403.
40 See Blessing, supra note 19, at 2404.
41 Bergman, supra note 8, at 623-24.
42 1991 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) [26,809 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), available at 1991 WL 311921.
43 Id. at 24,771-72.
44 Id. at 24,772.
41 See id. at 24,773-75.
46 Id. at 24,773.
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Just five months later, the same court provided a partial answer to that question
with respect to sampling in Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc.47
In Grand Upright, the court held that a rap artist's partial incorporation of another
artist's copyrighted composition into a rap recording infringed on the artist's valid
copyright.48 Accordingly, the court decided not only what was protectable 49-in other
words, what was copyrightable-but also what constituted a violation of that pro-
tection 50 -in other words, what constituted infringement of that work's copyright.
Also, the court condemned the increasingly widespread practice of sampling in the
music industry as mere stealing.5' In issuing its laconic ruling, harsh in comparison
to its holding in McDonald, the court seemed to leave no room for de minimis or fair
use exceptions;12 when a copyright is validly issued, the work is protected, and any
copying of that work without permission is a violation.
Grand Upright was "the first federal ruling that viewed unsanctioned sampling
as an infringement of the copyright owner's exclusive rights," rendering all unautho-
rized sampling legally suspect and thus susceptible to infringement actions. 53 The de-
cision glossed over any nuance in the McDonald decision and treated the copying as
"stealing," without any searching inquiry into the "copyrightability" or "protectability"
of the plaintiff's work. "Due to the court's 'disinclination to discuss applicable stan-
dards of law, the potentially landmark decision [is] of little value either as precedent
or advice.""
Not long after the Grand Upright decision, and in a courtroom not far away, sam-
plers received another blow. In Jarvis v. A & M Records,5 the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey held that defendant music producers, who admitted
to actually copying the plaintiff's sound recording and did not ask permission to do
so, could be liable for copyright infringement for having sampled several short lyrical
and musical sections from plaintiffs recording, despite defendants' argument that the
47 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
48 Id. at 185.
4' The court implied that a valid copyright on the original work created a presumption of
protection for any portion of that work. See id. at 183-85. Other courts have held that copyright
protection extends only to component parts of the work only to the extent that those component
parts are original to the author. See, e.g., Quinn v. City of Detroit, 23 F. Supp. 2d 741, 746-47
(E.D. Mich. 1998) (citing Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991)).
50 See Grand Upright, 780 F. Supp. at 185.
5' See id. at 183.
52 For more complete treatment of "fair use" as an affirmative defense to copyright infringe-
ment in the context of sampling, see infra Part I.B.3.
13 Bergman, supra note 8, at 625-26.
14 Id. (quoting Carl A. Falstrom, Note, Thou Shalt Not Steal: Grand Upright Music Ltd.
v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc. and the Future of Digital Sound Sampling in Popular Music,
45 HASTINGs L.J. 359, 362 (1994)). Put simply, the Grand Upright court's terse and narrow
opinion provides little analytical help, let alone any black-letter guidance to those who would
counsel would-be samplers.
" 827 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1993).
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sampled portions were insignificant.56 On its way to this holding, the court simplified
the prevailing test57 for the de minimis defense in digital sampling cases to a single
question: "whether the defendant appropriated, either quantitatively or qualitatively,
'constituent elements of the work that are original'....
Not surprisingly, the rulings in Grand Upright and Jarvis made sampling more
expensive, forcing artists to clear samples before releasing their work rather than take
the risk of employing unlicensed samples.59 Those artists who could not afford to pay
for clearance, as well as those who unsuccessfully sought clearance from the copyright
holders, experienced the "chilling effect" on their craft brought on by these rulings.
Samplers received a bit of good news a year later, when the Supreme Court issued
its decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.6° In holding that the commercial
character of a rap song, which parodied an existing work, did not create a presumption
against fair use,61 the Court provided a standard for musicians to look to when borrow-
ing from other musicians, if not a standard for samplers as such. The Court stated that
the creation of transformative works generally furthers the goal of copyright, which
is to promote science and the arts.62 "Such [transformative] works thus lie at the heart
of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copy-
right, and the more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of
other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use., 63
Thus, treating songs incorporating samples as "transformative" of the original work
could allow sampling to be permitted under fair use.
2. Recent Cases
For approximately another decade, samplers trod softly, and the case law re-
mained essentially intact. But in 2002, the United States District Court for the Central
District of California gave samplers a bit more breathing room than the Grand Upright
56 Id. at 292.
" The standard typically applied is that of "fragmented literal similarity," that is, a portion
of the original work is copied such that there is literal verbatim similarity between the two
works but that the original work's overall essence or structure is not taken. See 4 MELVILLE
B. NIMMER& DAVIDNIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][2], at 13-53 (2006). Courts
will also sometimes employ a qualitative/quantitative similarity analysis. See, e.g., Bridgeport
Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films LLC, 230 F. Supp. 2d 830 (M.D. Tenn. 2002). Occasionally,
courts blur the distinction between the two formulations. See, e.g., Newton v. Diamond, 349
F.3d 591 (9th Cir. 2003), amended and superseded on denial of reh'g by 388 F.3d 1189 (9th
Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1114 (2005).
58 Jarvis, 827 F. Supp. at 291 (quoting Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499
U.S. 340 (1991)).
" Norek, supra note 25, at 87.
60 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
61 Id.
62 See id. at 579.
63 Id. (citation omitted).
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court in New York. In Newton v. Diamond,64 the court held that even though they did
not get permission to use plaintiff's composition, defendants were not liable for copy-
right infringement for sampling a recording to which plaintiff held the compositional
rights because, as purely compositional elements, the three notes at issue were not suf-
ficiently original to warrant copyright protection, and, in any event, the use was de
minimis. 65 In other words, the court held that the portion of plaintiffs work copied
by defendants was not, in the words of the McDonald court, "protectable." 66
Meanwhile, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee
was moving in a similar direction. In Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films
LLC,67 the owner of a partial copyright interest in a rap song sued a movie producer
for using a sample of both the composition and the sound recording of the song in a
movie soundtrack.6 s The court dismissed all claims arising from infringement of the
musical composition after determining that the licenses defendant received were valid,
leaving only the sound recording at issue.69 Largely because the sound recording and
not the musical composition was at issue, the Bridgeport court diverged from the
Newton court in rejecting defendant's argument that the sampled portion of plain-
tiff's work was not original.7 ° Still, the court found the use to be de minimis-i.e., that
the sampled sound recording did not rise to the level of a legally cognizable appro-
priation-because (1) "no reasonablejury... would recognize the source of the sample
without having been told of its source," (2) the "minimal quantitative [nature of the]
copying," and (3) "the lack of qualitative similarity between the works.' In allowing
defendant's use under the de minimis standard, the court said, "[A] balance must be
struck between protecting an artist's interests, and depriving other artists of the build-
ing blocks of future works. 72
The plaintiff in Newton appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, but was unsuccessful.73 The Ninth Circuit took a different analytical ap-
proach than the district court when it assumed the notes at issue to be original. 74 Still,
it affirmed the lower court's decision, holding the defendants did not need a license
4 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff'd, 349 F.3d 591 (9th Cir. 2003), amended
and superseded on denial of reh 'g by 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S.
1114 (2005). It is worth noting that the defendants in this case were the Beastie Boys, and the
work at issue was a song from their follow-up album to Paul's Boutique.
65 Id. at 1256, 1259.
6 Id.; sec McDonald v. Multimedia Entm't, Inc., 1991 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 26,809,
at 24,773 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), available at 1991 WL 311921.
67 230 F. Supp. 2d 830 (M.D. Tenn. 2002).
68 id.
69 Id. at 838.
70 Id. at 839.
11 Id. at 842.
72 Id.
73 Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591 (9th Cir. 2003), amended and superseded on denial
of reh'g by 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1114 (2005).
74 Id. at 594.
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to the underlying composition because defendants' use was de minimis, that is, an
"average audience" would not recognize the appropriation.75
The most recent case in this arena, however, went against the preceding trend of
allowing de minimis sampling. The plaintiffs in Bridgeport appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which reversed the district court's de-
cision.76 In Bridgeport II, the court interpreted the Copyright Act as prohibiting any
use of a copyrighted sound recording for sampling without proper authorization.7 As
a result, the court greatly limited the ability of artists to lawfully incorporate samples
into their work, even if the samplers altered the original sound recording. Specifically,
the Bridgeport II court removed any de minimis defense that a defendant might raise
where the defendant undeniably sampled a copyrighted sound recording. As the
Sixth Circuit perfunctorily put it, "a sound recording owner has the exclusive right
to 'sample' his own recording."79 This dealt a serious blow to the practice of sampling
and underscored the need for the law governing sampling to be revised.
I. LEGAL BASES AND GOALS FOR THE LAW GOVERNING SAMPLING
Copyright law provides the foundation for the law governing digital music sam-
pling, granting protection to the owners of the sound recording copyright in the re-
arranging, remixing, and altering of the sounds fixed in the recording as well as to
owners of the musical composition copyright embodied in that recording.8" Any
analysis of the law governing sampling, then, begins with its roots in the Constitution
and copyright law.
A. The Constitution
Congress's authority to regulate copyright comes from the Copyright Clause,
which grants Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries." 8' Congress "first utilized this author-
ity... [in 1790] by adopting a federal Copyright Act," amending it several times
since.82 The most recent comprehensive revision to the Copyright Act is the
Copyright Act of 1976.83
75 Id. at 598.
76 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (Bridgeportl), 410 F.3d 792 (6thCir. 2005).
7 Id. at 798.
78 id.
79 Id. at 801.
80 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2000 & 2006 Supp.), amended by Pub. L. No. 109-303, 120
Stat. 1478 (2006); see also Loren, supra note 33, at 697-98.
8" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
82 Blessing, supra note 19, at 2405.
83 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2000).
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Arguably, another section of the Constitution addresses copyright law in general
and sampling more specifically. Some scholars have posited that the First Amend-
ment 84 ought to inform copyright law and protect some derivative works. 85 But when
confronted with the prospect, courts have generally dismissed such an argument.86
This Note contends the First Amendment should, in fact, inform the legal analysis of
the law governing digital music sampling, because such an analysis would improve
the copyright law's fidelity to its root principles and, as a practical matter, make more
manageable the currently problematic practice of sampling.87
B. The Copyright Act
1. Generally
In general, the constitutional charge "[tio promote the Progress of Science" moti-
vates the Copyright Act.88 The Act grants copyright protection to "original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed,
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
84 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
85 See, e.g., Charles C. Goetsch, Parody as Free Speech-The Replacement of the Fair
Use Doctrine by First Amendment Protection, 3 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 39 (1980); Jed
Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1
(2002).
86 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (stating that, because the First
Amendment and Copyright Clause "were adopted close in time," the Framers viewed copy-
right's limited monopolies as "compatible with free speech principles," though not explicitly
addressing the aspect of derivative works), reh'g denied, 538 U.S. 916 (2003); Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1440 n.2 (6th Cir. 1992) (recognizing but rejecting
the idea of "turning every copyright case into a mini-Marbury v. Madison or New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan"), rev'd, 510 U.S. 569 (1994); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 434 n.2 (9th Cir.
1986) (rejecting the notion that "the First Amendment gives parodists a blanket protection
from copyright infringement actions"). In Campbell, the Sixth Circuit, quoting the Supreme
Court's landmark decision in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,429
(1984), concluded that "'[a]s the text of the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress that has
been assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted
to authors or to inventors."' Campbell, 972 F.2d at 1440 n.2.
87 See infra Part III.B, C.2.
88 The complete clause, "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts," U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, does not apply completely to the Copyright Act. Indeed, at the time
the Constitution was drafted, "science" was relevant to copyright while "useful arts" pertained
to patents. See Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful
Arts: The Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States
Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PRoP. L. 1,51-52 (1994) (explaining that the Framers understood
"science" to mean "knowledge" and "learning," and "useful arts" to mean "helpful or valu-
able trades").
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directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 9 The Act also grants the owner of
the copyright the exclusive right to reproduce the work, prepare derivative works,
distribute copies of the work publicly, perform the work publicly, display the work
publicly, and, "in the case of sound recordings," perform the work publicly "by means
of a digital audio transmission." 9 A "derivative work" is defined to be "a work based
upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, drama-
tization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction...
or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted."9' Songs
incorporating samples from preexisting copyrighted works seem to meet the definition
of derivative works.92
2. Distinguishing Between Rights in Sound Recordings and Rights in Musical
Compositions
In 1971, Congress amended copyright law to include protection for sound record-
ings fixed and published on or after February 15, 1972.93 The Act defines "sound
recordings" as "works that result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or
other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes,
or other phonorecords, in which they are embodied."' The change allowed an artist
composing and recording a musical work to hold two copyrights: one in the sound
recording and another in the composition itself.95 As amended, the Copyright Act
distinguishes between sound recordings and musical compositions, and rights in sound
recordings do not extend to the songs themselves.96 For the purposes of sampling, the
Copyright Act covers all musical compositions and all sound recordings made after
89 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
90 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000); see also 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2000 & 2006 Supp.), amended
by Pub. L. No. 109-303, 120 Stat. 1478 (2006).
91 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
92 See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801 n. 10(6th Cir.
2005) (relying on Susan J. Latham, Newton v. Diamond: Measuring the Legitimacy of
Unauthorized Compositional Sampling-A Clue Illuminated and Obscured, 26 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 119, 125 (2003)).
" U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION FOR SOUND RECORDINGS 1 (rev.
2006), available at http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ56.pdf. Although sound recordings
fixed before February 15, 1972, may remain protected under common law or state statutes,
because "[a]ny rights or remedies under state law for sound recordings fixed before [then] are
not annulled or limited by the 1976 Copyright Act until February 15, 2047," id., this Note
confines its discussion to federal law.
94 17 U.S.C. § 101.
" T.B. Harms Co. v. Jem Records, 655 F. Supp. 1575, 1576 n.1 (D.N.J. 1987).
96 See id.; WuILIAM F. PATRY, LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 209 (6th ed. 1986).
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February 15, 1972.97 The Copyright Act does not provide for federal protection in
sound recordings made prior to that date.
98
The scope of the copyright holder's exclusive rights in a sound recording is
defined by § 114.99 First, the copyright owner's "right to duplicate the sound
recording in the form of phonorecords or copies [is limited to those] that directly or
indirectly recapture the actual sounds fixed in the recording."'" Second, the
copyright owner's "right to prepare a derivative work [is limited to one] in which
the actual sounds fixed in the sound recording are rearranged, remixed, or otherwise
altered in sequence or quality."'0 ' Third, the rights of the copyright holder "do not
extend to the making or duplication of another sound recording that consists entirely
of an independent fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or
simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording."' 02 These provisions factor
significantly into the analysis of the propriety of digital music sampling." 3
3. The Fair Use Exception
Section 107 of the Copyright Act provides an exception to the copyright law under
"fair use" and codifies what was once a common law doctrine."° The preamble of
§ 107 provides a nonexclusive list of favored purposes that are deemed "fair": "criti-
cism, comment, news reporting, teaching .... scholarship, or research."'0 5 Through
the Copyright Act, Congress instructs courts to consider whether an unlicensed use of
copyrighted material ought to be afforded an affirmative defense, once infringement
has been proved, by considering whether the new work serves some important social
purpose or public good.'06 The Copyright Act dictates that courts consider, along
with other relevant factors of each particular case, the following statutory factors:
97 See PATRY, supra note 96, at 209.
98 See Fantasy, Inc. v. La Face Records, No. C96-4384-SC-ENE, 1997 WL 627544, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 1997) (citing Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 211 n.4 (1985);
Lone Ranger Television, Inc. v. Program Radio Corp., 740 F.2d 718, 720 (9th Cir. 1984)).
99 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2000 & 2006 Supp.), amended by Pub. L. No. 109-303, 120
Stat. 1478 (2006). The section lays out four exclusive rights; three of the rights, which are
relevant to this discussion, are outlined here. The fourth right, which deals with recordings
used in educational programs distributed by public broadcasting entities, is not germane to
this discussion and therefore has been ignored.
1oo Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 800-02 (6th Cir.
2005).
'0 See Lim, supra note 10, at 376 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000)).
'o 17 U.S.C. § 107; see also Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair
Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1525, 1629 (2004) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107).
'o See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 477-78 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); Robert M. Szymanski, Audio Pastiche: Digital
Sampling, Intermediate Copying, Fair Use, 3 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 271, 312 (1996).
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(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational pur-
poses;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.'07
Courts have seldom granted the fair use defense in the sampling context, focusing on
"whether the song in question comments on or criticizes the original. If so-and only
if so-" the defense will apply and the song in question will be protected by law.'0 8
So far, in the context of music, the Supreme Court has recognized the defense only
for parody.' 9
The fair use defense and the de minimis defense are generally the only two af-
firmative defenses available to samplers accused of infringement. "0 But, as the next
subpart illustrates, recent court decisions have put at least one of those defenses in
jeopardy.
C. Current Case Law
Two conflicting circuit court decisions"' handed down in the past several years-
the most recent appellate-level authority on this issue--have drawn into focus the need
for more clarity in the law governing digital music sampling. Although one addressed
the appropriation of a musical composition"2 and the other a sound recording,' 13 the
two take fundamentally differing attitudes toward the practice of sampling.
1. Newton H
The first of these cases, Newton v. Diamond (Newton II),"1 came before the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in 2003. The dispute in Newton II stemmed from the
107 17 U.S.C. § 107; see also Lim, supra note 10, at 376 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107).
108 Madeleine Baran, Copyright and Music: A History Told in MP3's, http://www.illegal-
art.org/audio/historic.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2006).
"o See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
" See Ruiz de la Torre, supra note 19, at 402.
... Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (BridgeportIl), 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005);
Newton v. Diamond (Newton I1), 349 F.3d 591 (9th Cir. 2003), amended and superseded on
denial of reh'g by 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1114 (2005).
112 Newton 11, 349 F.3d at 592.
"3 Bridgeport I, 410 F.3d at 796.
114 349 F.3d 591.
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Beastie Boys' use of a six-second, three-note sample in their song "Pass the Mic."''15
The question before the court was whether the Beastie Boys could be liable for copy-
right infringement for appropriating the sample, to which they had obtained the sound
recording license, without obtaining a license from the holder of the musical compo-
sition right, jazz flutist James Newton. 16
Newton performed and recorded a song called "Choir," from which the sample
was taken, licensing all rights in the sound recording to ECM Records for $5,000 but
retaining the underlying compositional right."' Although the Beastie Boys paid ECM
Records $1,000 to use portions of the song "Choir" in their song "Pass the Mic," they
failed to obtain a license from Newton regarding the underlying composition." 8
The lower court held that, as a matter of law, the sampled portion of "Choir" was
not original enough to be copyrightable; it also concluded that, even if it were copy-
rightable, the Beastie Boys' use of the sample was "de minimis and therefore not ac-
tionable."" 9 Asserting its prerogative to affirm the grant of summary judgment on
any reason supported by the record, the Ninth Circuit assumed the sampled portion
of the song was "sufficiently original" to be copyrightable and based its decision on
de minimis grounds.12
0
Proceeding from the principle that substantial similarity between the original
work and the copying work is required in order to maintain an infringement action,
the Ninth Circuit considered whether an "average audience would.., recognize the
appropriation."'' The court went on to suggest that when "a use is de minimis be-
cause no audience would recognize the appropriation.., the works are not substan-
tially similar."' 122 In this way, the court rooted its de minimis analysis in the doctrine
of substantial similarity. 1
23
Because the Beastie Boys had obtained a license for the sound recording, only the
compositional elements of the song, not the particular performance of the song cap-
tured by the licensed recording, were at issue. 24 The score to "Choir," the embodi-
ment of the musical composition, included instructions that the performer play the
entire song "slowly/without-measure," while "sing[ing] into the flute and finger[ing]
I" Id. at 593.
116 Id. at 592.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 593.
"9 Id. at 592 (citing Newton v. Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1256, 1259 (C.D. Cal.
2002)).
120 Id. at 594.
121 Id. (citing Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 434 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986)). The court also noted
that both the general test for substantial similarity and the de minimis analysis consider "the
response of the average audience to ... determine whether a use is infringing." Id.
122 Id. at 595.
123 See id. at 595-96.
124 Id.
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simultaneously." '125 Relying on this orchestration, Newton argued that his performance
technique was embodied in the musical composition and not solely a function of the
particular sound recording.
26
The court concluded, however, that the composition did not fully capture
"Newton's highly developed performance techniques" found in the sound recording,
which was not, in the court's view, "the result of a generic rendition of the compo-
sition."'127 Therefore, even if the average audience recognized Newton's technique
in "Pass the Mic," such performance elements were outside the scope of his claim
for infringement on the musical composition.'28
In determining the degree and substantiality of the works' similarity, the court
further concluded that the Beastie Boys' use of the composition was not substantial
enough to sustain an infringement action. 29 The court suggested that even when a
sampler does not modify the sampled work in any way, thus retaining the highest
degree of similarity possible, there need not be a finding of substantial similarity.130
Indeed, "'[if] the similarity is only as to nonessential matters, then a finding of no sub-
stantial similarity should result."" 3' Calling this a case of "fragmented literal simi-
larity," 32 the court considered "the qualitative and quantitative significance of the
copied portion in relation to [Newton's] work as a whole" to determine whether the
similarity goes to trivial or to substantial elements. 3 3 Because the sampled segment
constituted "roughly two percent" of the "Choir" recording, the court found the sample
not to be quantitatively significant.13 ' Likewise, the court found the sampled segment
not to be qualitatively significant because, though representative of the scored, as op-
posed to improvised, portions of the composition, the segment proved to be "no more
significant than any other."'' 35 Therefore, the court reasoned, the works lacked sub-
stantial similarity, the average audience would not recognize the appropriation, and
the Beastie Boys' use was de minimis. 13
2. Bridgeport II
A year and a half later, the Sixth Circuit handed down its final decision in a simi-
lar case, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (Bridgeport Ii). 137 The dispute
125 Id. at 593.
126 See id. at 593-96.
127 Id. at 595.
128 Id. at 596.
129 Id. at 597.
130 Id. at 596.
'31 Id. (quoting 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 57, § 13.03[A][2][a], at 13-56 (2006)).
132 Id. For a brief discussion of the term, see supra note 57.
133 Newton II, 349 F.3d at 596.
114 Id. at 597.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 598.
137 410 F.3d 792 (6thCir. 2005). Although the court made its initial decision in September
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in Bridgeport II arose out of the use of a three-note, four-second guitar riff from the
musical composition and sound recording "Get Off Your Ass and Jam" in the song
"100 Miles and Runnin'," which appeared on the soundtrack to the movie I Got the
Hook Up. 1
38
The relevant issue on appeal was whether defendant No Limit Films, the producer
of I Got the Hook Up, infringed on the copyright interest of Westbound Records, Inc.,
which claimed sound recording rights in "Get Off Your Ass and Jam.' ' 39 No Limit
Films did not deny that the soundtrack to I Got the Hook Up used portions of "100
Miles and Runnin"' that incorporated the sample from "Get Off Your Ass and Jam." 40
Instead it argued that the sample was not protected because it was not original and,
alternatively, that the sample was legally so insubstantial, or de minimis, as to not con-
stitute infringement. 4 '
The court below held that there must be a balance between protecting an artist's
existing work and barring others from having building blocks for future works.'42 Al-
though it found the sample to be original, the district court allowed the defendant's
use under the de minimis standard. 4 3 Relying largely on No Limit Films' failure to
dispute that it digitally sampled portions of the sound recording "Get Off Your Ass
and Jam," the Sixth Circuit reversed.'"
Explicitly stating its goal of formulating a bright-line test for "what constitutes
actionable infringement with regard to the digital sampling of copyrighted sound re-
cordings,"' 4 5 the Sixth Circuit relied heavily on the language of § 114 of the Copy-
right Act'" to reach its conclusion. 147 The court seemed to take a "best we can do"
approach, acknowledging later in its opinion that Congress might be able to afford
a better solution because the statute, passed in 1971, had not contemplated digital
music sampling.'48
The court read Congress's grant of the exclusive right to duplicate the sound re-
cording in § 114(b) to mean that the world was free to recreate the work, assuming
musical composition rights, but that the holder of the sound recording right alone
could employ that recording. 149 It concluded that if the only one who could control
2004, it later granted a panel rehearing on the issues discussed herein; as a result of the re-
hearing, the court amended its opinion in June 2005 to further clarify its reasoning. Id. at 795.
138 See id. at 795-96.
9 See id. at 795-97.
'40 Id. at 796.
141 Id. at 796-97.
142 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 230 F. Supp. 2d 830,842 (M.D. Tenn. 2002).
' See Bridgeport 11, 410 F.3d at 797.
144 Id. at 798.
14' Id. at 799.
146 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2000 & 2006 Supp.), amended by Pub. L. No. 109-303, 120 Stat.
1478 (2006).
141 See Bridgeport 11, 410 F.3d at 799-801.
148 Id. at 805; see also Bergman, supra note 8, at 646 n.159.
149 Bridgeport II, 410 F.3d at 800.
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the whole recording was the holder of the sound recording copyright, then the only
one who can appropriate something less than that whole is that same holder of the
sound recording copyright. 50 In the court's view, the language of the statute pre-
cluded the use of a substantial similarity test. 5 ' In so concluding, the Bridgeport II
court removed any de minimis defense that a defendant might raise where the defen-
dant undeniably sampled a copyrighted sound recording.'52
The court extolled the virtues of its ruling, citing the ease of enforcement, the
market forces that would keep licensing costs in line, and the purposeful, as opposed
to accidental, nature of sampling. 53 But the court acknowledged that its opinion need
not be the last word on the issue, saying that if the rule turned out not to be in the in-
terest of the recording industry, it should lobby Congress for a change or clarifica-
tion in the law. 54 In addition, the court left open the possibility of a fair use defense
on remand. 5
5
After beginning to offer samplers more breathing room, judicial interpretation
of the law governing digital music sampling took an abrupt anti-sampler turn with the
decision in Bridgeport II. This decision, the decision in Newton II to a certain extent,
and the anti-sampler decisions of the early 1990s have all made the task of one who
wishes to sample legally confusing at best and all but impossible at worst. But these
decisions have strayed from the guiding principles of the law and as such may prop-
erly be viewed with suspicion.
D. Goals of the Law
As with any sound analysis, a return to first principles is required in order to
analyze the propriety of developments in the law governing digital music sampling.
Although the "immediate effect[s]" of copyright protection are "to secure a fair return
for an 'author's' creative labor," copyright protection is ultimately aimed at promoting
"artistic creativity for the general public good."' 5 6 This ultimate aim comes from the
Constitution's directive "[t]o promote the Progress of Science."'57 To achieve these
ends, the Copyright Act grants copyright holders a limited monopoly over their work,
which provides an incentive for creation by providing a financial benefit-the exclu-
sive right to the revenue from licensing fees, sales, royalties, and performance fees.158
150 See id. (concluding that because one may not pirate an entire sound recording, one may
not also pirate a smaller portion of it).
151 Id. at 801 n.10.
152 Id. at 798.
"' Id. at 801.
154 Id. at 805.
155 Id.
156 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
157 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
58 Eric Shimanoff, The Odd Couple: Postmodern Culture and Copyright Law, 11 MEDIA
L. & POL'Y 12, 18 (2002).
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But "the benefits of copyright protection are intended to promote maximization of
public benefit," and "[a]ny private benefit experienced by creators is incidental to this
purpose."' 59 Indeed, "courts in passing upon particular claims of infringement must
occasionally subordinate the copyright holder's interest in a maximum financial return
to the greater public interest in the development of art, science and industry."' 6
The fundamental question in any infringement action, asked by Justice Story at
a time when digital music sampling could hardly have been imagined, is whether "so
much is taken... that the value of the original is sensibly diminished, or the labors of
the original author are substantially to an injurious extent appropriated by another.' 6'
Because sampling, by definition, consists of appropriating existing and usually copy-
righted material to create new works, conflicts under copyright law are bound to arise
with some regularity. Although the copyright law seeks to promote creativity, "the
current state of the law... discourage[s] the creativity of sampling artists" by creating
substantial barriers to working in and experimenting with their chosen medium.162 As
exemplified by Bridgeport II, the current law, which provides complete protection to
at least the holder of the sound recording rights, fails to strike a balance between the
competing interests of artistic progress on the one hand, and on the other, authorial
incentives to create the expressions that ensure this progress.
One commentator has suggested that such a balance may be struck, distilling the
purpose of the law down to a set of five goals:
(1) set clear, predictable boundaries for sampling artists, (2) keep
costs reasonable for sampling artists, (3) minimize the use of liti-
gation to settle infringement questions, (4) minimize the diffi-
culties involved in negotiating licenses, and (5) provide adequate
economic benefits for copyright owners (so they will have an in-
centive to produce new works). 163
Although this is not the only set of considerations by which to measure a sol-
ution, 16' it provides a manageable number of considerations without favoring either
economic or creative interests. These considerations will provide a means of assessing
the appropriateness of the current law and proposed changes to the law. 165
'5 Brodin, supra note 35, at 830.
'6 Berlin v. E.C. Publ'ns, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
822 (1964).
161 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
162 Ruiz de la Torre, supra note 19, at 403.
163 Id.
164 See, e.g., Blessing, supra note 19, at 2421-22 (suggesting considerations that favor
creative interests).
165 For a more complete analysis of the appropriateness of the law governing digital music
sampling, see infra Part II.B-C.
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II. THE GREYALBUM EXPERIENCE
A. The Grey Album Narrative
Brian Burton channeled the Beastie Boys and Dust Brothers in his own way in late
2003 when he began creating a new sound out of old material on The Grey Album. He
combined Jay-Z's vocals with more than the unaltered musical accompaniment of The
Beatles but rather with the dissected, augmented, and looped portions of that accompa-
niment, similar to what might come out of a drum machine and a synthesizer-staples
of hip-hop production."6 Burton accomplished this task of layering and modifying
tracks over the course of just two weeks, using a relatively simple software program
called ACID Pro.'
67
In so doing, Burton not only established a new standard in digital music sampling
as its own genre but also cross-pollinated the rock and rap fan bases, thereby making
substantial contributions to the progress of the at. 168 After the album found its way
to the public, largely via the Internet, it became one of the most sought-after albums
at the time; in fact, the album achieved the equivalent of gold status, or selling more
than 100,000 complete copies, in a single day.' 69
But because Burton had not received permission from the copyright owners of
The Black Album and The White Album, he violated copyright law when he released
The Grey Album to the public. 170 EMI, which controls the sound recording rights of
The White Album,' and Sony Music/ATV Publishing, which owns the musical compo-
sitions, objected to Burton's use of their copyrighted material. 72 Apart from Burton's
admission that the samples came from The White Album, listeners, including those at
EMI and Sony/ATV, could discern the source of the samples from famous lyrics and
instrumental sections that Burton added to reinforce the feeling that the original works
were manipulated to create a new work of art. 7 3 Shortly after the album's release
"6 See Noah Balch, Comment, The Grey Note, 24 REV. LIG. 581, 583 (2005).
167 See Lim, supra note 10, at 371 (citing Corey Moss, Grey Album Producer Danger
Mouse Explains How He Did It, MTV NEWS, Mar. 11, 2004, http://www.mtv.com/news/
articles/1485693/200403 1 l/jayz.jhtml).
168 See Balch, supra note 166, at 582 (quoting Shaheem Reid & Joseph Patel, Remixers Turn
Jay-Z's Black Album Grey, White and Brown, MTV NEWS, Jan. 26, 2004, http://www.mtv
.connews/articles/1484608/01262004/jay-z.jhtml).
169 See id. (citing Grey Tuesday, http://www.greytuesday.org (last visited Nov. 21,2006)).
170 See id.
17' Id. at 583. It has been suggested that EMI does not control the sound recordings for The
White Album because it was released in 1968, four years before federal copyright protection for
sound recordings went into effect. See Electronic Frontier Foundation, Grey Tuesday: A Quick
Overview of the Legal Terrain, http://www.eff.org/IP/grey-juesday.php (last visited Oct. 30,
2006). Some record labels have argued that "digital remastering" creates a new work that is pro-
tected, but there is as yet no case law or other binding authority to support this position. Id.
17 See Balch, supra note 166, at 583.
173 See id.
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in early 2004, EMI sent cease-and-desist letters to Web sites and record stores that were
distributing the album, asserting its exclusive rights in the recordings. 74 Although
the album mostly disappeared from public access as distributors complied with EMI's
letters, many staged a one-day protest on Tuesday, February 24, 2004, calling it "Grey
Tuesday," and once again made the album available. 75 The "Grey Tuesday" partici-
pants hoped to show the record labels that they deemed the copyright law (as the labels
saw it) to be unworthy of respect. 76 They sought to give credence to their position
by demonstrating the commercial potential of The Grey Album.
77
B. Current Law Succeeds in Several Respects
17 8
The current copyright law as applied to digital music sampling at and around the
time Burton released The Grey Album succeeded in meeting several of its goals, namely
(1) establishing a bright-line rule for samplers, (2) minimizing the use of litigation to
resolve disputes, and (3) providing economic benefits to copyright owners to ensure
future creative works. Although these successes indicate the law continues to function
on some level, they fail to prove the law is sufficiently tailored to satisfy all the inter-
ests at issue.
First, although Bridgeport I had not yet been decided at the time the events sur-
rounding the release of The Grey Album took place, the bright-line rule enunciated in
the case, as an interpretation of § 114 of the Copyright Act, seemed to be what EMI
had in mind when sending out its cease-and-desist letters. As stated by the Sixth
Circuit in its decision, such a reading of the statute had strong scholarly support.1
79
In this way, the law succeeded by providing a "clear, predictable boundar[y]" for
Burton as to what was permissible unlicensed sampling of The White Album sound
recording: none.180
By the same token, the categorical rule that no unlicensed sampling is permis-
sible served to "minimize the use of litigation to settle [the] infringement question[]"
at issue. 8 ' That nothing more than cease-and-desist letters went out is evidence of
174 See id.
175 See Grey Tuesday, supra note 169.
176 See id.
177 See id.
78 This subpart and the one that follows consider the events surrounding the release of
The Grey Album in the context of current interpretation of the law governing digital music
sampling, including the decisions in Newport II and Bridgeport II, even though one of those
decisions may not have applied for jurisdictional reasons and the other had not yet been
handed down.
"9 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (Bridgeport I1), 410 F.3d 792, 802-03 &
n.18 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing KOHN & KOHN, supra note 20, at 1486-87).
180 See supra text accompanying notes 149-53. This answer is notwithstanding the debate
over whether the sound recording of The White Album, made before the 1971 amendments
to the Copyright Act, is protected by federal copyright law.
8' Ruiz de la Torre, surpa note 19, at 403.
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this success. Similarly, Newton Ir s rule that the unlicensed use of a musical compo-
sition may be permissible if shown to be de minimis provides, if not a bright-line
rule, at least a reliable analytical rubric to ascertain the likelihood a court would find
infringement. In this way, its predictability should guide samplers in determining
what they can and cannot use, ultimately leading to a reduction in litigation as a
method of dispute resolution.
Finally, the holders of both the musical composition and sound recording rights
were able to defend their interests in those aspects of The White Album and thereby
protect their pecuniary interest therein. Because the rights-holders involved in the
dispute were not the artists themselves, no direct incentive aimed at promoting crea-
tivity was involved in this case. EMI and Sony/ATV stepped into the shoes of the
artists, who transferred their interests in those rights to those entities, presumably in
some bargained-for exchange. At the time of such an exchange, the artists received
a current benefit in exchange for their rights to receive future benefits designed to
incent their creativity. If the law diminished or ignored those rights, artists would
be less inclined to create future works because any associated rights from which the
artists derive financial benefit may not be enough for them to invest in creating the
original work in the first place. 8 ' In the case of The Grey Album, because EMI and
Sony/ATV were able to prevent Burton's use of their copyrighted material, the value
of the copyrights was preserved and the artists' and, in turn, the corporations' expec-
tations were honored. 8
3
C. Current Law's Successes are Uncertain but Its Failures are Apparent
Despite its successes, the current law has failed in meeting several crucial goals.
Not only may the current law fail, rather than succeed, with respect to the factors
discussed in the preceding subpart," but the law already has failed to (1) keep costs
reasonable for sampling artists and (2) minimize the difficulties involved in nego-
tiating licenses.
First, although the rule governing the use of musical compositions enunciated
in Newton II provides some guidance to sampling artists as to what they may sample
without obtaining a license, it does not provide "clear, predictable boundaries.' ' 8 ' A
sampler must consider the substantial similarity between his contemplated work and
the original work in order to assess whether his planned sampling will run afoul of the
law. As the Newton II court indicated in its analysis, a court can reach its decision
through a combination of the fragmented literal similarity test and the qualitative and
182 See, e.g., id.
183 See supra Part H.A.
'84 Namely, (1) establishing a bright-line rule for samplers, (2) minimizing the use of liti-
gation to resolve disputes, and (3) providing economic benefits to copyright owners to ensure
future creative works.
85 See Ruiz de la Torre, supra note 19, at 403.
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quantitative substantiality test. 8 6 But those formulations may also be utilized indi-
vidually and need not lead to the same result. 187 Therefore, because the formulation
of the test is not certain, the answer to the question of whether the unlicensed sam-
pling is permissible is equally uncertain. Even if the test were clear, the answer would
remain heavily dependent on the individual facts of the case and the court's deter-
mination. As a result, the issue may well still be litigated, particularly in jurisdictions
outside the Ninth Circuit and in situations involving well-financed complainants.
Second, although it makes much of its bright-line rule regarding sound recordings,
the Bridgeport II decision acknowledges that the defendant in the case can argue fair
use on remand.' This substantially undermines the court's attempt at settling the law
regarding unlicensed use of sound recordings, allowing blurriness to persist around
the bright line it set out to draw. In this way, the benefits of clarity and predictability
are reduced and, again, the issue may still be litigated, particularly in otherjurisdictions.
Even accepting that the bright-line rule suggested by the Bridgeport H court pro-
vides at least some clarity for sampling artists like Burton, it is drawn sharply in favor
of the original artist and to the detriment of the sampling artist. The court argues that,
because an artist is free to independently fix new sounds in order to re-create or re-
record a "sample" in the studio, its rule will not "stifl[e] creativity in any significant
way. '"89 But this position ignores, or at least gives short shrift to, the artistic value of
incorporating the original recording itself. Sampling, as an art form involving sonic
collage or pastiche, depends on the use of the original recording to maintain its integ-
rity.' 9 A re-recording of a riff may sound similar or even identical, but the authentic-
ity as a sample is utterly lacking, making the court's proposal unacceptable from an
artistic point of view.
The Bridgeport II court goes on to justify its ruling by saying that market forces
will keep the cost of licenses within reasonable bounds.' 9' But the court bases this as-
sertion on the faulty assumption, addressed above, that the re-recording of a sample
is equivalent to the original recording. 92 Relying on this faulty assumption, the court
asserts that the rational marketplace will prevent the cost of licensing from exceed-
ing the cost of re-recording.' 93 Because of the uniqueness of the original work to be
sampled, the copyright holder commands a monopoly position. Market forces are of
186 See Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591, 596 (9th Cir. 2003), amended and superseded
on denial of reh'g by 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1114 (2005).
187 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
188 See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (BridgeportII), 410 F.3d 792,805 (6th
Cir. 2005).
189 Id. at 801.
9 See generally Jason H. Marcus, Note, Don't Stop That Funky Beat: The Essentiality of
Digital Music Sampling to Rap Music, 13 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 767 (1991).
'' See Bridgeport 11, 410 F.3d at 801.
192 See id.
193 Id.
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little help to the earnest sampler who, without the consent of the copyright holder,
cannot obtain the essential materials he needs to create the art he envisions.
Apart from Bridgeport H's bright-line rule, "the lack of discemable guidelines
could have a chilling effect on musicians since they may be afraid to follow through
with their artistic visions for fear of [suit] for copyright infringement."' 94 Small-time
and emerging artists are especially harmed by the current law, as they most lack the
time, money, and negotiating clout to bargain for the licenses.'95 The cost of clearing
samples is prohibitive for most artists, particularly such smaller and emerging artists,
and it entirely prevents them from realizing their creative vision legally.' 96 The Sixth
Circuit's observation that "it would appear to be cheaper to license than to litigate"' 97
is of little comfort to the emerging artist who lacks resources to do either. In addition,
because the current system requires licensing from both the sound recording copyright
holder and the musical composition copyright holder, it creates economic inefficien-
cies.' 98 In this way, the law fails to keep costs reasonable for sampling artists and fails
to minimize the difficulties involved in negotiating licenses. In so doing, the law stifles
creativity and goes against its fundamental basis, namely, to "promote the Progress
of Science."' 99
Third, complete protection of the copyright holders' exclusive right to the sound
recording and, in most cases, the musical composition preserves the economic incen-
tives to produce new works. The current system works well for upfront compensation
of copyright owners, but it may fail to capture long-term compensation. Allowing a
sampler to use the copyrighted work may in fact indirectly enhance creative incen-
tives, rather than diminish them. If the sample is effective, those who hear it in the
new work will be reminded of the original work, rekindling an interest in it and per-
haps even related works by the sampled artist. Those unfamiliar with the sampled work
or artist may become new fans of the sampled artist. In this way, sampling should be
seen as a sharing or common enterprise rather than an adversarial appropriation."00
9 Bergman, supra note 8, at 646.
In theory, such small-time and emerging artists might be helped under the current system
when their works are sampled. In practice, however, such artists will not likely be sampled
much themselves because a sample derives much of its force, and thus its desirability, from
its recognizability.
196 See Norek, supra note 25, at 91 ("For an independent artist, the price for clearing a single
sample can run more than an entire album's recording budget.... This creates a barrier to entry
for independent or developing acts. Even for major label artists, record companies typically
require the artist to bear the cost of licensing samples, and any master use fee and mechanical
royalty payments will be deducted from those otherwise payable to the artist.... [Tihis makes
it very difficult for a developing hip-hop artist to recoup the costs of producing and creating
the album, much less to make a profit.").
197 Bridgeport H, 410 F.3d at 802.
198 See Bergman, supra note 8, at 646-47 (quoting Loren, supra note 33, at 697-98).
"' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
200 See Rubenfeld, supra note 85, at 21.
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Similarly, the sampled and sampling artist could enter into a more direct common-
enterprise arrangement through the sampler's granting the samplee a partial interest
in the new work. Although such an arrangement might be negotiated, the current
problems confronting sampling would not be relieved unless such a system were uni-
versally compulsory, giving all artists an equal opportunity to benefit. After all, "in
many instances, today's sampler is tomorrow's samplee."' ' Therefore, by squeezing
out small-time artists like Burton and preventing them from being able to negotiate
a deal, the current system may deny copyright owners economic opportunities to take
risks on emerging artists with significant potential for commercial success-a doubly
bad result.
III. POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS TO THE LAW GOVERNING DIGITAL
MUSIC SAMPLING
As the foregoing analysis suggests, the current law fails to meet its goals in sig-
nificant ways. But the law is not beyond repair. Considering the goals of the law, this
Part outlines ways in which the law might be improved.
A. Compulsory Licensing System
A popular solution for addressing the failings of the current law governing digital
music sampling involves a compulsory licensing system.20 2 Seeking to strike a bal-
ance between the "domination via copyright[] and... insufficient incentives to create
works in the first place, compulsory licensing" falls midway between the two ex-
tremes---on one end, granting full copyright, which gives owners very broad powers,
and on the other, denying copyright protection altogether." 3 Such a system would re-
semble the one currently in place for granting permission to play "cover" songs, which
are new versions of existing songs performed by someone other than the original
artist.204 This system governing entire compositions compels a copyright owner to
license his work to others once he has licensed it to one.205 Because samples can vary
in length and quality,20 6 however, any such compulsory licensing system applied to
20 Bridgeport II, 410 F.3d at 804.
202 This approach has many respected advocates, including Professor Lawrence Lessig of
Stanford University. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 241-59 (2001).
203 See Robert P. Merges, Compulsory Licensing vs. The Three "Golden Oldies: Property
Rights, Contracts, and Markets," POL'Y ANALYSIS (Cato Institute, Washington, D.C.), Janu-
ary 15, 2004, at 1, 4, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa508.pdf.
204 See Ruiz de la Torre, supra note 19, at 403 ("When an artist covers a song, they must
purchase a compulsory mechanical license from the copyright holder pursuant to Section 115
of the Copyright Act.... [This fee is] paid to the original work's publisher for every copy
of the track sold." (citations omitted)).
205 See Bergman, supra note 8, at 649 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2003)).
206 "Samples vary drastically in terms of their qualitative value, as there is a major difference
between sampling a 'hook' and a background element of a song." Id.
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sampling would require the rate paid to be determined by categorizing the sample
employed.0 7
Such a system would largely achieve the goals set out in Part I.D of this Note:
copyright owners would be quickly and adequately compensated, sampling artists
would pay reasonable licensing fees up front, tailored to the substantiality of their
re-uses, and negotiation time would generally be minimized, thereby lowering trans-
action costs. The uniqueness of samples could be taken into account. Samplers would
also be relatively free to ply their trade, allowing for almost unfettered progress in the
art. But a certain amount of subjectivity would remain in any proposed bucketing
system, so the need for litigation may not be entirely eliminated.2 8
Drawbacks to the system include: (1) subjective judgments by the Librarian of
Congress, who oversees the Copyright Office, in determining the rate, with no guar-
antee that those rates will be any less arbitrary than those currently in place; (2) an
inability to take into account the popularity of the sampled song and artist; (3) an in-
ability of sampled artists to control how their work is used; and (4) a lack of a repu-
tational check on bad-faith dealing as exists in the current system.29 Most important,
opponents argue, market forces are taken out of the equation and long-run incentives
to create new works are diminished.2 0 Although the music industry seems content
with the current system, it once defended the compulsory licensing system under simi-
lar circumstances.2 ' It might do well to do so again.
B. First Amendment-Augmented Fair Use
A more radical but perhaps necessary approach would be to grant samplers partial
rights in the work sampled, or at least shield them from an infringement claim from
207 This notion of bucketing different types of samples based on the substantiality of the
re-use for purposes of determining the amount of payment to the copyright owner has wide
acceptance. See, e.g., Charles E. Maier, A Sample for Pay Keeps the Lawyers Away: A
Proposed Solution for Artists Who Sample and Artists Who are Sampled, VAND. J. ENT. L.
& PRAC., Spring 2003, at 100-02; Bergman, supra note 8, at 649.
208 Ruiz de la Torre, supra note 19, at 403-04.
209 Bergman, supra note 8, at 650-51 (citing Szymanski, supra note 106, at 295-97).
2'0 A compulsory rate would create an inflexible, top-down, "legislative lock-in," preventing
"voluntary, arm's-length deals negotiated to fit the dynamics of individual buyers and sellers."
Merges, supra note 203, at 4.
211 See Bergman, supra note 8, at 649-50 ("Interestingly, in 1967, when Congress was
considering dismissing the compulsory license provisions from the Copyright Act, record
industry leaders argued vigorously to retain it, claiming 'performers need unhampered access
to musical material on non-discriminatory terms.' They claimed that the compulsory licensing
scheme resulted in 'an outpouring of recorded music, with the public being given lower prices,
improved quality and a greater choice.' If compulsory licensing was so beneficial to the music
industry in terms of creating new compositions, then under these arguments, a newer form of
creating music, such as sampling, would also greatly benefit from uniform rates and schemes."
(quoting Lawrence Lessig, Keynote Speech at the Hastings Music Law Summit West (Feb.
25, 2004))).
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the copyright holder, based on a type of fair use grounded in the First Amendment.
Fair use on its own, as an express exception in the copyright law, has been suggested
as a potential safe harbor for samplers.2" 2 Such a system would embrace sampling as
an art form and provide a clear standard for judges to apply.213 But traditional fair use
analysis generally does not permit the use if it is commercial in nature. 14
It is possible, on the other hand, that copyright could be limited by the First
Amendment, providing a more flexible approach than traditional fair use analysis.215
If that were the case, even the "commercial speech" of digital music sampling could
be protected because it is creative.21 6
It has been argued that "fair use exists to supply creativity that the market econ-
omy fails to induce, ' 217 and that fair use analysis "consists of balancing (in economic
terms, or in broader social welfare terms) the interests of the individual copyright
holder against the interests of 'society' or 'the public.""'2 8 The Copyright Act's § 107
factors seek to rectify the failure and achieve that balance. But, as Professor Michael
J. Madison argues, such factors are not, by themselves, capable of attaining those
goals.219 Rather, because the issue of individual use of copyrighted works is really the
issue of use of those works at a social level, he suggests that the question of whether
a use is "fair" should be a question of whether the use "is undertaken in the context
of a recognized social or cultural pattern, and the four statutory fair use factors should
be interpreted and applied as part of an overall pattern-oriented framework.""22 "That
pattern should exist largely independent of the legal system itself and be adjacent to,
but not ordinarily part of, the market economy."221 Applying such an analysis to digi-
tal music sampling justifies affording it this "pattern-oriented" protection under fair
use. Sampling has arguably taken on the status of a social or cultural pattern, which,
under Madison's analysis, would afford it shelter from the copyright law.
Supporting this idea of taking a more sociological approach to exceptions in the
copyright law, particularly with respect to digital music sampling, another commen-
tator, Professor Jed Rubenfeld, has argued that the First Amendment ought to clear
some space in the copyright law for certain artistic works.222 He has suggested that
212 id.
213 See Falstrom, supra note 54, at 380.
214 See Maier, supra note 207, at 100-01.
215 Even the copyright power is limited by the freedoms secured by the First Amendment.
See Lee v. Runge, 404 U.S. 887, 892-93 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Melville B. Nimmer,
Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17
UCLA L. REv. 1180 (1970).
216 See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 85, at 46-48.
217 Madison, supra note 105, at 1624; see also id. at 1565.
218 Id. at 1624; see also id. at 1567.
219 See id. at 1623.
220 id.
221 Id. at 1530.
222 Rubenfeld, supra note 85.
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"the constitutional protection of art is best understood through a principle [called] 'the
freedom of imagination,"' under which a person cannot "be penalized for imagining
or for communicating what he imagines... [n]or can a person be required to obtain
permission from anyone in order to exercise his imagination," and that "copyright...
must answer to this freedom. ' 23 Rubenfeld argues that "the enormous and growing
set of prohibitions imposed by modem copyright law on so-called 'derivative' works"
is in conflict with this freedom and concludes that "copyright's prohibition of unauthor-
ized derivative works is unconstitutional.2 24 The basic question is "how govern-
ment may constitutionally block some people, but not everyone, from engaging in
certain otherwise protected speech acts. 225
Rubenfeld suggests that copyright law ignores three fundamental principles of free
speech jurisprudence: (1) content-based restrictions get strict scrutiny, (2) no prior re-
straints, and (3) viewpoint-based restrictions are unconstitutional per se.226 Moreover,
the Supreme Court has never listed copyrighted works among the classes of speech
that do not receive First Amendment protection. 27 In fact, courts have almost univer-
sally declined, either explicitly or implicitly, to consider seriously whether the First
Amendment ought to apply in copyright infringement cases.228 He also convincingly
dismisses as inadequate the four explanations offered for copyright's insulation from
First Amendment speech protections: (1) Congress's express power to grant copy-
rights, (2) the idea/expression distinction and fair use doctrine already handle free
speech concerns, (3) copyrights increase overall speech production, and (4) there is
no free speech right to steal someone else's property.2 29
First, the argument that Congress's express power to grant copyrights insulates
copyright law from free speech protections "gets backward the relationship between
powers and rights. 230 The power is one that Congress can exercise, but it is subordi-
nate to the right to free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment. 231 As Rubenfeld
puts it simply, "[r]ights trump powers, not vice versa. '232
223 Id. at 4.
224 Id. at 5.
225 Id. at 20.
226 Id. at 5-6.
227 Id. at 7.
228 Id. Even though a work is not a parody, it may still deserve the benefit of First Amend-
ment protection. The Supreme Court has left open such a possibility in prior decisions. See,
e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (addressing only the question of duration
of copyrights and suggesting copyright is not categorically immune to First Amendment chal-
lenge), reh'g denied, 538 U.S. 916 (2003); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
582-83 (1994). An appropriate case has not come before the Court to afford it an opportunity
to reach the issue.
229 Rubenfeld, supra note 85, at 12-30.
230 Id. at 12.
231 Id.
232 Id.
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Second, by claiming to regulate only the expression and not the idea, copyright
law runs afoul of the notion that certain expressions cannot be substituted and must
be protected.233 In addition, fair speech is not free speech."' In other words, there are
constitutional minimums at play that copyright law must respect.
Third, the First Amendment's goal "is not maximization of total speech pro-
duction... [or] the achievement of an efficient speech market, generating exactly
as much speech as people are willing to pay for. '235 The policy objectives of copy-
right and free speech are at odds, as free speech cannot be "reduced to efficient or
wealth-maximizing speech. 236
Finally, the analogy to ordinary property law fails because "[copyright law]
make[s] people liable for speaking, whereas ordinary property law does not... [, and
it] create[s] a kind of private power over public speech that ordinary property law
does not. '237 Just as there is a difference between arson and flag burning, there is a
difference between stealing and speaking.238
Rubenfeld thus argues that copyright law, as currently formulated, is unconstitu-
tional. 239 For practical reasons, this Note does not take quite such an extreme stance.
Rather than advocate for the abrogation of copyright law on constitutional grounds,
this Note seeks to bring copyright law into constitutional balance by modifying the
fair use analysis. Rubenfeld says it makes sense for the fair use doctrine to be eco-
nomically oriented because it serves copyright's goal of creating incentives to stimulate
production of creative works.' 4 But such a system cannot capture freedom of speech
concerns and is, on its own, insufficient.24
Under current law, a sampler who fails to negotiate licenses from those who own
the copyrights to the underlying work is subject to liability for copyright infringe-
ment.242 Rubenfeld would argue that such liability conflicts with the First Amendment
and the freedom of imagination because the sampler would be punished simply for
"speaking." 243 Although one might counter that the sampler is not being punished for
"speaking" but for "stealing," such an argument fails because, as Rubenfeld suggests,
233 Id. at 14-15. Rubenfeld roundly rejects the notion that copyright regulates only ex-
pression. In support of his position, Rubenfeld relies on Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971), in which the conviction of a man whose jacket read "Fuck the Draft" was overturned.
Rubenfeld says that "[i]f the First Amendment protected only ideas, and not particular ex-
pressions thereof, Cohen should have gone to jail." Id. at 15.
234 Id. at 18.
235 Id. at 23.
236 Id. at 23-24.
237 Id. at 25.
238 See id. at 26.
239 See generally id.
240 Id. at 20.
241 Id. at 21.
242 See supra Introduction.B.
243 See Rubenfeld, supra note 85, at 41.
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the sampler is being punished for conduct that cannot be dissociated from its com-
municative or expressive nature.2' In this way, the sampler's First Amendment rights
have been trammeled by a power that is properly subordinate to those rights.
A system granting nearly unfettered use would address Rubenfeld's concerns.
Under such a system, almost all unlicensed sampling should be permitted. But eco-
nomic concerns, precisely those that the current fair use doctrine sets out to protect,
cannot be ignored. To prevent complete copying and outright piracy, therefore, un-
licensed sampling should be permitted unless the market for the original underlying
work is supplanted or adversely affected, as an indication that the speech was not done
in artistic good faith but purely for profit. This would be a factual determination left
to a court.
There are many reasons to recommend such a system, as it largely meets the goals
set out above.24" First, samplers will have clear, predictable boundaries when practic-
ing their art-all sampling is allowed unless it is done in bad faith as outright piracy.2 6
Second, costs for sampling artists are kept to a minimum, requiring only access to the
digital sound recording to be employed. Third, while infringement questions may still
crop up at the margins, most sampling will be done in good faith and litigation will
rarely be needed to settle disputes. Fourth, because negotiation is no longer required,
associated difficulties disappear.
The fifth factor, providing adequate economic benefits for copyright owners so
that they will have an incentive to produce new works, seems most problematic. In-
deed, copyright owners will not be compensated directly for the use of their sound
recording or musical composition. But an artist whose work is sampled may receive
an indirect financial benefit from the increased interest in the original work and a more
dynamic music industry on the whole. Such concerns are minimized when taking
a macro view, in which the "sampler becomes samplee" mechanism can take effect.
The marketplace of ideas should be allowed to operate and listeners should be able to
decide what they want to listen to. In the worst case, an action for profit-allocation
can resolve the economic interests and incentives.
C. How Might The Grey Album Events Have Played Out Under Proposed
Solutions?
Had a compulsory licensing system been in place, Burton, EMI, and Sony/ATV
all could have benefited directly. Given the demand demonstrated on Grey Tuesday,247
even under a compulsory system in which the copyright holders' financial stake is set,
244 See id.
245 See supra Part I.D.
246 Rubenfeld would rightly exclude piracy from First Amendment protection on the basis
that it constitutes a "fail[ure] to exercise... imagination" and thus finds no safe harbor in a
notion of imaginative or communicative activity. Rubenfeld, supra note 85, at 48.
247 Grey Tuesday, supra note 169.
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such a system could have been mutually beneficial for the sampler and the samplee.
Although the question of profit maximization is an empirical one impossible to an-
swer at this point, it is the wrong question. As long as the artists, or the corporate enti-
ties standing in their shoes, are compensated adequately at the same time the sampler
is allowed to express himself, the system succeeds in promoting the progress of science.
Alternatively, under the proposed First Amendment-based fair use analysis, Burton
would have been free to sample at will to create his art, without direct or indirect pay-
ments to EMI or Sony/ATV. Although the financial interests of the copyright holders
would not have been taken into account directly, Burton's use of their work would
have provided more diffuse benefits-first, through increased interest in and sales
of the underlying works, and second, through the passive "what goes around comes
around," "sampler becomes samplee" system.
CONCLUSION
The Framers and Congress did not create and amend copyright law with digital
music sampling in mind. The law that has come to govern sampling is broken, failing
to achieve its constitutional goals by giving too much control to copyright holders.
The law may be mended in several ways so as to comport with the Constitution, in-
cluding the creation of a compulsory system, which has a good deal of support, as well
as a First Amendment-based system, which, though novel, may even be constitution-
ally mandated. Although compensation to copyright holders may not be maximized
directly, it may still provide the appropriate creative incentives while allowing the
"science" of art to progress in other important and constitutionally significant ways.
In this way, future artists in the mold of the Beastie Boys and DJ Danger Mouse will
earn recognition for their "grey" work and be able to push the state of the art to such
great heights.
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